Parking is at the heart of any modern city, considering its spatial influence and its role in urban mobility. It is also a key component of its urban landscape management and a critical component of an efficient transportation system. However, parking is still a source of environmental nuisance and quality of living collapse. There are many challenging issues that arise, such as land consumption, occupancy of public space, economic impact, pedestrian safety and social fairness. This becomes even more alarming in dense and ultra-dense urban environments where the availability of parking places significantly affects the traffic fluidity, and where a lack of parking spots is the main trigger of parking/traffic congestion. In this article, we propose a set of dynamic and zone-aware pricing strategies to solve the parking issues and traffic congestion. As a case study, we consider the administrative district of Casablanca city, the economic capital of Morocco. Our scheme is suitable for mixed-use areas, as it takes into account the presence of different driver profiles with different parking needs. Here, we aim to improve the rotation of attractive spots (located nearby zones of interest) and set a usage-based parking assignment via appropriate incentives. Inherently, this is equivalent to use strategic pricing to strategically control the parking dwell time, which ensures a usage-based fair sharing of public space among users and improves the traffic conditions in the target area.
I. INTRODUCTION
Parking is a key component of a sustainable mobility policy in urban areas. It plays a critical role in travel planning and transport management. It is also the primary factor impacting modal choice, and an effective solution for freeing up public spaces. However, land scarcity and ineffective parking pricing policies increase the difficulty of finding available space and induce additional traffic congestion; Which increases the environmental effect of each of the subsidiary car journeys [1] . Surprisingly, Shoup et al. [2] found out that around 8-74% of the traffic in central business districts (CBDs) is due to vehicles cruising for parking and the average time searching for a space is about 3.5 to 14 min.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Miltiadis Lytras . Identified as one of the main cause of urban traffic congestion and travel time loss, finding available parking spaces has attracted many researchers, [2] - [10] . The common objective of these works is to reduce as much as possible the time lost while searching for an available space and the regretful consequences on the urban environment, and the quality of life/work.
The increase of drivers seeking for parking spots is mainly due to parkers that occupy the parking places for long time (commuters) and prevent the parking turnover. Yet, commuters, arriving earlier, take the best parking spots and drivers arriving in the city center, during day-time, do not find available places anymore. In [5] , four methods for searching parking available space are proposed: Blind Search (the most common method), Parking Information Sharing, Buffered Parking Information Sharing [11] and Reservationbased Smart Parking Systems [5] , [8] , [12] . Each of these methods has advantages and drawbacks. The last tree methods rely on the integration of information technology in the parking process through smart parking platforms. The smart parking, application of intelligent transportation systems in smart cities, represents a potential solution to address this issue. Smart parking roles and key functionalities have been widely discussed in related literature (see e.g., [3] - [5] , [7] , [12] - [20] ) in recent years, as a powerful tool to solve the parking and induced traffic problems. Through the development of parking reservation and distributed systems, drivers can check the availability of parking in real-time, book a spot remotely and are no longer required to be physically at the parking to get served.
For efficient use of such an interactive system, driver should be informed that the target area takes only customers who have booked earlier, in order to avoid unnecessary flows (drivers without reservations) competing for available parking spots. Moreover, the parker should control his/her parking dwell time to avoid excessive invoicing. Another problem for the reservation of spaces is that customer who arrives and finds his/her spot occupied by the previous parker or another unreserved parker, with no space available in the parking lot, will be asked to leave unserved, which would generate drivers' frustration. Finally, the cost of implementing such a heavy solution is expensive, especially on-street lot, given the number of equipment to install per space (sensors, cameras, retractable bollard, etc.).
From previous statements, pricing policies clearly constitute an efficient control parameter to alleviate the search for parking slots and discourage usage of personal cars. Furthermore, the difficulty of acquiring on-street real-time parking information (unlike off-street parking with detection systems i.e., sensors, cameras, etc.), makes the pricing policy a powerful tool for parking offer-demand management in dense/ultra-dense urban area.
Parking pricing policies, as part of the out-of-pocket costs, is becoming a key factor to influence driver decisions and solve traffic issues without any advanced infrastructure or additional upgrades to install. Namely, an efficient pricing ensures, through parker financial constraint, a great incentive mechanism considering the parking capacity and also maximizes the benefit of the parking operator. Moreover, such a sensitive measure is to be applied, as a fine parking pricing can reduce and/or induce travel demand [21] . It has been proven that the availability of parking space in the workplace and the absence or low cost associated greatly promote the use of personal cars [22] .
In this paper, we focus on the impact of the parking price on the visitors of a town's attractive districts (e.g., central administrative district) and how pricing policies can positively affect their transport modality. Central administrative district groups the various administrations of cities (public services, court, city council, prefecture, bank headquarters, etc.). It accommodates visitors of different profiles and each profile has a number of features and parking specific requirements:
-Commuters (long-term users): This class of users are daily visitors (workers) using a parking lots for long durations (8-10 hours); -Frequent visitors (medium-term users): Visitors, such as lawyers, architects, accountants, etc. who use a parking lot for limited parking time per day (2-4 hours); -Intermittent visitors (short-term users): Visitors who spent less than 2 hours in the parking lot.
Therefore, an efficient parking solution should be designed to consider users' profiles and usage heterogeneity, and to regulate urban traffic as well, both in terms of:
volume: A parking supply should always be consistent with the level of road accessibility to an area; -usage: A parking supply should make it possible to combine, in a given area, all the profiles made necessary by the local urban fabric.
Further, the parking dimensioning and management in such a mixed-use area are the two essential parameters that will have to be attuned in order to meet the best experience for users, the highest incomes for operator, and the best territory mobility pattern for the whole society. A more efficient management of parking demand can improve the utilization of the limited parking capacity in high-demand areas [10] . In this respect, reducing the number of long-term parking spots combined with suitable measures allowing short-term parking are elemental. Such a measure permits maintaining high access for short-term activities, while limiting access for commuters. Table 1 illustrates an example of different parking policies. Each policy is intended for an area with some specific type of activities (administrative, business, etc.), a tolerated parking dwell time and the pricing policy that should be implemented. Definitely, proposed parking restrictions should be determined depending on the quality of installed public transportation service in/to/from the target area. Here, we build a dynamic traffic-aware and zone-aware parking pricing policy. Next, we implement our solution for the administrative district of Casablanca city in Morocco. The proposed pricing policy aims to control the parking dwell time nearby zones of interest to maintain a high user-friendliness of this mixed-use area.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we exhibit a literature review on legacy pricing solutions for parking. In Section III, we build a queuing framework to capture the driver behavior, the parking demand-servicefeatures and other parameters influencing the parker choice and the operator revenue. Section IV lists proposed dynamic pricing policies. In Section V, we present an implementation of our solution with realistic traces from Casablanca city, and discuss obtained results and effectiveness of our scheme. We draw some concluding remarks and insights in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Parking pricing has attracted a tremendous research effort, being an important component of a city or an urban area. It aims to efficiently manage travel demand and shrewdly allocate parking spots. This way, a coherent pricing policy should be well defined to control travel planning, absorb parking demand and match the walking distance to the parking dwell time of users. Therefore, it is imperative to strategically allocate available spots. In particular, the most attractive spots should be allocated to short-term drivers (the less time the driver parks, the closer he/she parks). Namely, this allows to improve the spaces rotation and public space sharing while maintaining a fluid traffic within urban areas.
There are two type of parking facilities: on-street parking (where vehicles are parked on the street) and off-street parking (where vehicle are parked on a building or facilities indoor or outdoor) [5] . Thanks to a low price of onstreet parking spaces, drivers prefer to first seek on the streets instead of parking in off-street parking lots. In fact, the city and municipal authorities generally seek to maximize the social well-fare of citizens ( [7] , [23] ) instead of being financial-benefit-driven. For instance, authors in [23] propose an Origin-Destination (O-D) Parking Pricing which is a spatial parking pricing strategy clearly depending on distance between origin and destination. The main goal of the proposed scheme is to optimize the parking charges while taking into account the transit supply available on each O-D pair. Thus, the parking fees increase for the O-D pairs fairly served by transit systems, while it should decrease for the O-D pairs that are poorly served or are not served by transit systems at all. Compared to other schemes, this proposal could help ensure fair urban mobility, but ensuring a good quality of public transport service is an important measure to be taken into consideration, in parallel, when implementing such a non-neutral pricing strategy.
Numerous research studies have been conducted related to parking price effects on trip generation, parking congestion and modal choice [24] - [31] . In [26] , a trip-aware pricing is considered, and authors therein show a progressively widening gap in price sensitivity between trips made for business purposes relative to non-business purposes. As the parking fees increase, business trip makers are generally less sensible to parking price compared to those making non-business trips. The authors in [27] analyze the impact of time-dependent pricing, and neighborhood characteristics on on-street parking demand in Seattle city. The parking fee is adjusted to ensure parking availability over a specified geographic area and time period parking; In [28] and [29] , the authors deal with the issue of preferred lots and discuss how a dynamic pricing policy, combined with parking information provisioning, can balance the parking demand and improve parking management to achieve a terminal occupancy of around 85%-95%. Authors of [10] introduce a parking policy for visitors to Stockholm innercity in Sweden, that aims to improve the utilization of the limited parking capacity in areas with high-demand. The parking occupancy, including its temporal variations, is measured by ticket vending machines which is calibrated using observed data collected via a floating car. The goal of this system is to reduce the pre-experiment level of parking occupancy using a dynamic zone-based pricing policy. It has been shown that parking is underpriced in central areas and tends to reduce related externalities. Another interesting work that combines parking reservation and pricing models to overcome the parking spot scarcity is [24] . It proposes a mathematical optimization model while using dynamic pricing based on real-time resource utilization by occupancy and reservations. The objective of this model is to minimize drivers' total monetary cost while maximizing parking resources utilization. In [21] , the effect of road pricing and hourly parking pricing on traffic equilibrium with elastic demand is pointed out. It comes out that road pricing strictly reduces demand. Meantime, hourly parking pricing can reduce or induce demand depending on the parking dwell time elasticity (to the hourly parking price). When dwell time is elastic, demand always increases with parking fee. However, when parking time is inelastic, demand may increase or decrease with the parking price.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic pricing policy to solve the parking congestion in crowded areas, and consider Casablanca as a case study for our scheme implementation. Our proposal is (destination) area-based, so that parking fees change with the (destination) zone. Three tariff zones are defined depending on their distance from the attractive zone, so that in the vicinity of attractive areas short-term parking should be encouraged. Our solution allows the presence of specific users in each zone, controls the parking dwell time for improved spots rotation in target area and allows a fair sharing of public space among drivers wishing to park.
III. UTILITY MODEL AND QUEUING ANALYSIS
Consider a central administrative district area served by S parkings, and hosting an average number of N drivers willing to park. Table 2 summarizes the main notations used throughout this paper.
The parking arrival rate and departure rate are described by a birth and death process with M /M /1/M i queueing. The number of parked vehicles k = 0, 1, · · · , M i is considered to be the state of the associated Markov chain, and π i k (t) is the probability of having k parked vehicles in parking i.
A. PARKING SELECTION & DRIVER DYNAMICS
Selecting a parking spot depends on both socio-economic characteristics of contending drivers and the main features of the available parking spots. From a driver outlook, the choice of parking lots has to be modeled using a discreet choice model, as one and only one option might be chosen at a given time. Yet, observed variables only take discrete values. Whereas explanatory variables can either be discrete (e.g., sex, route, etc.) or continuous (e. g. travel time, monetary cost, etc.) [32] . Moreover, discrete choice models are derived on the assumption that the decision-maker (parker) naturally seeks to maximize her utility, with some given rationality level to include uncontrolled parameters and random events.
While needing to park for τ (τ ≥ 0) time units, each driver u seeks to choose the parking lot that offers the most profitable reward. Among other behavior models used in related literature, we assume that the driver is captured using multinomial log-linear regression, also known as multinomial Logit model. This classification method generalizes the binary logistic regression to multiclass case where several options are available (see [36] and [37] ). More precisely, the multinomial model aims to predict the probabilities of the different possible actions (available parking lots). We denote G u i (·) the utility function of driver u while selecting parking i. Fundamentally, this utility function should reflect the satisfaction level of driver regarding the availability of a parking spot. This can be represented by the total travel cost till parking i at time t expressed as the sum of the various costs engaged during the driver's trip to his destination, including the probability to find an available parking spot. In our model, we focus on the drivers' utility in terms of their parking choices. For sake of simplicity, we ignore the use of public transit (multimodal system) and assume that drivers use their own cars along the entire trips to their destinations. Without loss of generality, it is plausible to assume that each driver is aware of his/her average driving costs, e.g., based on a daily experience and/or traffic information systems.
Let η u i (η u i ≥ 0) be a constant that captures how driver u adopts occupancy information at parking i (see [21] and [33] for detailed definitions), and let β u i (β u i ≥ 0) be the sensitivity of driver u with respect to parking i current tariff. It depends on several factors such as personal income, social class, age, gender, etc. Thus, the utility function G u i (t, τ, k) of driver u, seeking to park for τ time units, arriving at time instant t at parking i(with occupancy k), can be expressed as:
where F τ i (t) is the parking fees to be charged to driver u while getting parked for duration τ , by parking lot i at time t. This function will be derived in the next subsection. C walk u,i and C search u,i (k) are respectively the walk cost and the search cost to be derived afterward.
1) MARGINAL COST OF WALK TIME
Let T i,D +T D,i be the total time spent walking from/to parking i to/from destination D. In order to include an eco-friendly behavior diver and customize the whole travel experience, we introduce a parameters δ n telling whether the driver prefers walking (δ n < 0) or driving (δ n > 0). It depends on the driver personal preference, lifestyle, distance, time of day, safety, weather conditions (e.g., rain, accessibility, etc.), etc. Each driver u has a time valuation with respect to parking i denoted C u i . Therefore, the marginal cost related to walking phase is given by:
It is a function of the zone's occupancy (i.e., number of occupied parking spots) and can be estimated as the sum of the fuel cost (a monetary cost that depends on the vehicle, distance, traffic congestion, parking occupancy, time of day, etc.), and the cruise cost (time cost converted to monetary value, spent by the driver), like is expressed in (3) . Let C fuel u,i and C cruise u,i (k) denote the fuel cost consumed over the searching distance and the cruise cost respectively. Namely
3) MARGINAL COST OF CRUISE TIME It is the time spent cruising for parking multiplied by the time valuation of driver u. Namely:
Here, f u i (k) stands for the cruising time for an available parking spot within parking i. As in [21] and [33] , we assume that the cruising time is a convex function which depends on 1) the parking current occupancy (k); 2) the average searching time of parking i (l i ); 3) the capacity of parking i (M i ); and 4) a constant η u i ∈ [0, 1] quantifying how driver u adopts occupancy information of parking i. In other words, when η u i → 0, driver u just ignores the information on the parking current occupancy leading to an irrational behavior. Whilst the driver becomes very sensitive to the parking i's occupancy for η u i → 1. The cruising time for an idle spot becomes very large when the occupancy rate is high, and goes to infinity when the lot is fully occupied:
4) DRIVER DYNAMICS UNDER OBSERVABLE ENVIRONMENT
To understand, characterize and efficiently predict the decision maker's (the set of driver) behavior, transportation theorist and practitioners usually use discrete choice models such as Multinomial Logit [36] . Of course, alternative models such as Luce model, extreme value model, Probit, Nested logit model, etc. [37] could also be used when their parameters are well evaluated/estimated. Using the utility function defined in (1), the probability P n,i (t) that driver u chooses the parking lot i out of S installed parking lots, is given by:
From statistical physics perspective, σ u is interpreted as the inverse ''social temperature'' [34] . Here, it measures the rationality level of driver u when attempting to select where to park. On one hand, a high value of σ u reflects a rational behavior, and the parker u seeks the best strategy to maximize his/her reward. On the other hand, a low value of σ u means the driver is not rational and is likely to i.i.d. select any of the available parking lots. Thanks to current powerful traveler information systems, accurate route-guidance is not an issue anymore. Therefore, one could strategically help driver to enhance their rationality and then to boost the system whole performance. Multinomial Logit is quite simple and versatile, which makes it a powerful tool to predict the drivers' choices.
5) DRIVER DYNAMICS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Let U n i be the utility relating to the choice of alternative (parking lot) i for τ parking dwell time. It written as the sum of two parts: 1) deterministic part G u i (t, τ, k); and 2) a random term ξ u i (t) representing factors that affect the perceived utility (e.g., traffic congestion, incomplete information about available parkings, contending drivers, driver's preferences, actual parkings' occupancies, exact fuel consumption, etc.), while parking at i, but are not fully observable by the driver u. Namely, the utility function is now written:
Now, the driver only can perceive an estimateŨ u i (t, τ, k). Thus, finding the exact distribution of P n,i (t) under uncertainty is computationally cumbersome. This is why we propose to estimate the parking selection probabilities using the Boltzmann-Gibbs Payoff-Reinforcement Learning (BGP-RL) (see [38] for full description and convergence analysis):
where υ u i,t is the learning rate. In order to yield good estimates of the utility, this parameter has to take into account how many times the parking i has been chosen up to time instant t. 1 {a u t =i} is an indicator function telling if parking i has been selected (1) or not (0) during time instant t. Learning will help us to understand the behavior of the drivers during their interactions with each other and with the set of parkings. It is worth noting that under strongly perturbed environment, the rationality level parameter σ u can be time-varying.
B. PARKING OPERATOR POLICY
Consider the same central administrative district area with S parking, and N travelers with an average parking dwell timeτ . At equilibrium we have P u,i (t) = P u,i . Thus, the arrival rate of drivers selecting parking i is estimated by:
It is understood that since the capacity M i of parking i is limited, not all drivers having selected parking i could park. Some of them will be rejected due to lack of available spot. Thus, the expected number of blocked drivers by parking i is:
Let ρ i = λ i µ i be the mean load of parking i. Then, the mean number of parked vehiclesν i at parking i is:
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ω i is the mean expenditures to cover by parking i. They comprise maintenance costs for each lot (e.g., lot with sensor) or a block of lots (e.g., parking meter per block), agent salary costs, rental costs, cleaning costs, lighting costs, access barriers maintenance cost, etc. For new parking lots built, the depreciation cost (over 5 years to 10 years) must be taken into consideration.
In order to evaluate how does perform each single parking i, we derive a number of performance metrics. First, let estimate how much loss is caused by travelers' rejection due to lack of available spots. Parking i's revenue loses Lτ i is given by:
The total occupancy o i (τ ) of parking i is another useful performance metric measuring how long the parking remains unavailable. It can simply estimate as:
The Throughput or turnover T i (t 1 , t 2 ) of parking is defined to be the ratio between the total number of parked vehicles accommodated during t = |t 2 − t 1 | in parking i to the total number of parking spaces in parking i, can be estimated as:
The parking fees vary depending on the pricing policy adopted by each parking owner. We will exhibit a number of pricing policies in the next section. Parking Operator Problem: While the driver problem is straightforward and is mainly related to maximizing his/her chance to find an available spot at a low cost, the parking operator's problem might be more complex. Indeed, there are two scenarios: 1) The first case suggests the situation where each parking facility (or a set of parking lots) is managed by a different operator, forming an oligopoly market (this case emphasizes an adversarial market where public and private operators might compete with each other over market shares); 2) Whereas in the second scenario, a single operator is owning and managing all the parking facilities (here, this operator is more likely to be a public authority). However, it could also capture the case of a cartel (collusion) where all operators are anticompetitively cooperating to maximize their net revenue. Such a situation could be efficiently captured using game theory, this is out of the scope of this paper. Hereafter, we formulate a number of problems a parking owner has to solve in order to meet the associated goal.
-Maximizing Individual Profit (oligopoly market): Each operator i seeks to maximize its own net revenue R i while offering a blocked drivers (due to unavailable spots) smaller than n i :
-Maximizing Global Profit (Monopoly/Cartel): Here, the operator/cartel seeks to maximize its net revenue under some constraints on the maximum number of unparked drivers. This problem is expressed as:
-Minimizing Parking Unavailability/Occupancy: We turn now to optimize resource utilization in terms of parking occupancy. The parking operator aims to minimize the unavailability time of its parking, while granting a minimum revenue and a minimum number of blocked drivers, allowing operator strategy's stability and certain driver satisfaction. The problem is expressed as:
-Maximizing Usage Fairness: This scheme exhibits some nice features like offering high parking spots turnover while granting a minimum net revenue for long term stability. This problem is expressed as:
Maximize T i (t 1 , t 2 ) subject to R i (t 1 , t 2 ) ≥ r i and N blk i ≤ n i , ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N (19)
• Maximizing Driver Satisfaction: This scheme encourages high customer fidelity through minimizing the number of blocked drivers due to spot unavailability. This problem is expressed as:
Minimize N blk i (t 1 , t 2 ) subject to R i ≥ r i and N blk i ≤ n i , ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N (20)
IV. DYNAMIC PRICING POLICIES
The following section lists a number of pricing policies that could be implemented to sustain some targeted parking usage or to ensure fair occupancy among available parkings.
A. FLAT PRICING (FP)
The flat pricing policy suggests to charge a fixed price c i for using the parking spot whatever the dwell duration τ . It is commonly based on a daily-usage service and is appropriate during holidays or special events with sporadic attendance:
This policy aims to maintain nearby resident population in the city center by promoting parking close to their homes at a suitable rate. Many new parking facility owners use the flat rate as a starting policy since they do not have a clear view on the real demand of the parking lot, or are not quite sure how much revenue parking lot will generate. It is suitable for a gated or ungated parking lot and customer who wishes to park for long time (e.g., workers, residents, etc.). It is worth noting that no parking ticket machine is needed as the rate is not based on hourly duration.
B. LINEAR PRICING (LP)
The classic linear pricing policy charges a fixed rate c unit i per unit of time ($/time unit), whatever the period of the day. The parking fees are calculated, depending on the driver parking dwell time τ as:
Linear pricing is quite natural and is very easy to implement. However, it has an undesirable drawback as it does not offer incentives for drivers to use less/more the parking services. Moreover, this pricing scheme exhibits poor scaling features from the parking operator perspective.
C. DYNAMIC PRICING
The dynamic rate policies allow to strategically vary the parking fees while implementing suitable incentives to use parking resources more efficiently. Now, one could set an arrival-time-based pricing or an adaptive (either progressive or degressive) pricing. Under this scheme, one could also meet efficient tradeoffs between satisfactory occupancy and eco-friendly city facilities.
1) ARRIVAL-TIME-DEPENDENT PRICING (ATP)
Here, the parking fee to be paid varies according to the driver's arrival time. The parking operator sets a pricing vector
. . , c n i , with cardinality n and where c k i is the parking unit price to be charged when parked in time interval [k, k +1]. Thus, a driver who arrived at instant t wishing to park for τ time units, will be charged:
The main purpose of this policy is to control parking by incentivizing drivers to come earlier/later to match off-peak periods. This type of pricing policy could be efficiently implemented using sensors' history or automated parking transaction data through vending machines. Combining such a technique with a zone-based would be very promising.
2) USAGE-AWARE PRICING (UAP)
We turn now to present another pricing scheme that depends on how long a driver is using the parking available spot. The parking owner defines a pricing vector
. . ,c m i i , with cardinality m i andc i k being the parking fee for the k-th parking time unit. Therefore, a driver wishing to park for τ time units, and arriving at time instant t, will be charged:
In the following, we define two special usage-aware pricing:
3) PROGRESSIVE PRICING
Here, the parking tariff increases as the parking dwell time increases, i.e.,c 1 i ≤c 2 i ≤c 3 i ≤ · · · ≤c m i i . When the parking dwell time reaches a predefined level, the additional parking price jumps to a higher tariff. Since the price of parking directly influences the driver's behavior, the goal of this policy is to limit the parking duration in areas with high attractiveness (i.e. dense urban area) by increasing the price of parking; this pricing policy aims to reduce the permanent occupation of the public space by vehicles that are parked for long periods for a better sharing of public space; and encourages the development of economic activities and the reception of visitors by increasing the throughput or turnover of parking lots in attractive areas.
4) DEGRESSIVE PRICING
According to this policy, the parking price decreases according to time already spent in parking lot, i.e., c 1 i ≥c 2 i ≥c 3 i ≥ · · · ≥c m i i . If the parking dwell time reaches predefined levels, the additional parking price decreases to a new lower price and so on. Since parking significantly influences the modal shift choice, interventions in this area are among the most effective measures to increase ridership transit. Therefore, the aim of the degressive pricing policy is to encourage the use of alternative modes of travel to the car. This type of pricing is generally adopted by relay parks, i.e. parking lots located in different parts of the city (near a train station or subway, at the city gates . . . etc.), for encouraging drivers who work in the city centers to finish their trips by public transport. This pricing policy is also adopted by shopping centers that desire to attract as many customers as possible.
V. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: CASABLANCA CITY A. CASABLANCA METROPOLIS
In order to evaluate how does perform our dynamic and zone-aware pricing under realistic settings, we implemented it for the administrative district of Casablanca Metropolis, see Fig. 2 . Casablanca is the largest and most crowded city of Morocco. It is also the largest city in the Maghreb region and one of the major and most important (both economically and demographically) cities in Africa. It is then an excellent choice and a perfect venue to run innovative pilots, and living labs. Moreover, it shares similar context with many cities in Africa and Europe, allowing to efficiently draw important results.
In Casablanca, drivers perceive the parking as a basic right, contrary to other countries/cities where parking is seen as a powerful tool for urban mobility. It follows that several abnormalities in the use of parking spaces are observed in the city. Namely, poor compliance with standard rules particularly in areas with high parking demand, inconsistent pricing compared to areas equipped with parking meters, parking at prohibited spaces (e.g., sidewalks, illegal double parking even on main roads, etc.) which can considerably reduce lane capacity, causes safety issues and saturates the public space.
By analyzing the management system of existing parkings in Casablanca, several weaknesses/issues emerge: an insufficient and deficient control system in some sectors and the presence of system of car-guards at the same time with parking meter. The diagnosis of parking in Casablanca shows that the regulations are not always consistent and do not align with actual needs. Indeed, the adopted 2-hours parking limit does not meet the demand in this area. Our analysis also shows that parking management in the administrative district is much more complex: While the parking regulations and the onstreet lot price, fixed at 2MAD/Hour (around 0.2$/Hour), are intended to encourage parkers who park for less than 2 hours (short term), 90% of parked cars exceed this time. These are visitors to the city center (commerce and services) and commuters (parkers who come to work daily using their own cars). The massive presence of these long-term parkers has two dramatic consequences for the city center of Casablanca:
• They are responsible for the congestion observed around the city center of Casablanca, which degrades its attractiveness, air and life/work quality, in addition to permanently penalizing urban public transportation;
• They occupy the most attractive parking spots in the city center. Indeed, the "first come, first served" logic applies particularly in the parking sector. The commuters, arriving first, take the most attractive places and they only quit them by night. During the daytime, drivers arriving in the city center don't find available parking spots and are relegated to a distance that may exceed the acceptable walking time for short-term service. Clearly, these two elements are not only characteristic of Casablanca, as this problem has been observed in numerous metropolitan areas from Africa, Europe and other continents. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to build some efficient parking strategies for the Casablanca-like administrative district, aiming to:
• Reduce the parking supply for long-term commuter users; this involves moving parking from the city center to suitable car park relays, and encourages using multimodal system for users served by current and/or future lines of the public transportation network;
• Increase the parking offer for visitors to the city center: Short-term parking (generally less than 2 hours' dwell) is relatively rare in Casablanca. This is explained by visitor habits preferring longer parking dwell (up to 4 hours); and
• Exploit the parking offer such as to respond effectively to the expected parking lot uses: In a more practical sense, this objective aims to match the walking distance with the parking dwell time of the parkers. It will therefore be a question of reserving the most attractive places for short-term users (the less time a parker parks, the less time he is willing to park far away). Then, for mediumterm users, and finally for long-term users, for whom the long use of public space justifies a greater distance to walk to reach their destination. To meet these objectives, we recommend to implement three types of restricted areas. They are placed in the city center as described in Fig. 3 :
Red Zone: rotating zone, prioritizing short and very shortterm usages, limited to 2 hours, on restricted perimeters (the application of the time limit may be strict, i.e. prohibiting use beyond 2 hours, or flexible, via a very high price beyond 2 hours). Of course, employee and resident subscriptions must not be allowed in this area;
Blue Zone: medium duration zone on which parking is limited to 3 hours in order to avoid parking commuters. However, it is possible to extend the limitation of this zone to 4 hours at a higher price during the fourth hour in order to differentiate it from the red zone. The role of this zone is to allow visitors to park without allowing commuters and long-duration parking. This zone is spread around the rotating zones.
Green zone: long-term zone on which parking is unlimited in time and subscriptions for employees and residents are possible. Its main role is to regulate and control the parking of commuters.
Based on the strategy presented, it is therefore proposed to follow this rule: the longer the need to park, the less parking spaces are located close to the destination. This principle can be described as follows: in the vicinity of major activity areas (commercial end service areas in particular), short-term parking should be encouraged. Indeed, it is essential that parkers find a parking space nearby and that the walking distance is as short as possible. Running a customer for several minutes so that he only remains there for a limited time is not very thoughtful. The radius is about 400 meters, at most (less than or equal to 5 minutes by foot). If the need for parking is of medium duration, the parking spaces can be located a little further away, within a radius of 800 meters maximum (less than 10 minutes by foot). For long-term parking dwell, spots can be located on a wider perimeter, with walking times that could exceed 10 minutes.
Different types of pricing are proposed in Fig.3 depending on the parking area chosen. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT (HYPER-CENTER)
The administrative zone is the historical hyper-center of Casablanca. This area is characterized by a mixture of activities with sometime or incompatible needs in order to ensure their coexistence and the satisfaction of the various users/profiles. Major projects are being implemented in this area: Grand Theatre, Arab League, Mohammed V Square, etc. All these projects aim to restore the area's attractiveness and radiance as before.
The parking landscape in this district encloses around 4,300 spots distributed between on-street parking lots (∼80%), most of them are managed via parking meters; and under-utilized off-street parking spaces (Fig. 4) .
The target area is characterized by high occupancy during daytime (∼90%), with saturation in the most popular areas, which does not decrease sufficiently in the evening (∼80%) because of residential demand and business activities. This situation is mainly due to inappropriate current regulation and inefficient pricing (2MAD/Hour linear pricing for all parking lots) implemented by the parking meters. Thus, the key objectives to be targeted for this area can be summarized as:
• Increase the attractiveness and fluidify the traffic flow over this area by increasing the number of "short-term" users;
• Satisfy the medium-term parking needs;
• Reduce the long-term parking (commuters) demand in this area, as it is easily accessible by public transportation.
In order to achieve these objectives, we recommend to take two fundamentals measures:
1) MEASURE 1: INCENTIVE PRICING
Instead of the current linear pricing, this partial solution suggests to implement a usage-specific pricing. An incentive mechanism is to be adopted in order to encourage/discourage either short-term parking dwell or long-term parking dwells. Namely, we suggest the following (see Fig. 5 
): a: (POSITIVE) EXPONENTIAL GROWTH RATES
Under this scheme, a significant rise in parking fee is applied over time. It then prioritizes short-term parkers and tolerates medium-term parking at a fair pricing. Whereas, long-term parkers are charged substantial dwell fees. While adopting this pricing policy, some of above-listed goals will be achieved but a considerable long-term demand still to be properly processed. Considering a low potential for shortterm use to be addressed (only 10-20% of global demand), it is worth noting that this pricing might also suffer from a low occupancy ratio, which is seen as a monetary loss from the authority's view and a resource wastage from driver perspective.
b: LOGARITHMIC GROWTH RATES
This pricing scheme suggests an inciting cut in parking fees over time. Clearly such a system prioritizes long parking dwells, but it also might allow the rate to fit short-term and mid-term spots as well. However, increasing number of shortterm parking dwells will be challenging as it depends on the driver's reaction towards such a regulation.
These two incentive-based pricing schemes can be replaced by time-limits systems that exhibit a similar effect. Of course, the core goal of each of them is to prioritize one class of drivers over the other class.
2) MEASURE 2: AREA ZONIFICATION
This special measure incorporates some elements of Measure 1 while adopting a progressive/degressive pricing policy and target specific parkers according to a geographical criteria, see Fig. 5 . We aim here to encourage short and mid-term parking dwells by allowing them to park in the most attractive zones. A logarithmic growth pricing would then be proposed in areas far away zones of interest, whereas an exponential growth pricing is to be implemented nearby attractive zones. This combination enables a better control of the various effects of the parking policies while fluidifying the urban traffic. Namely, we implement a hard positive exponential pricing in the red zone; a soft positive exponential pricing in the blue zone; and a logarithmic pricing in the green zone (see Fig. 6 ).
3) NUMERICAL INVESTIGATIONS
We turn now to evaluate performance of our recommended measures (i.e., incentive pricing and zonification) considering real dataset (points of interest, parking locations, parking capacities, drivers' arrival rates, drivers' profiles, mean dwelling time, current pricing scheme, etc.) provided by Casablanca city. We consider the pricing scheme (linear pricing) currently being used as a benchmark. Figures 7-8 show the parking fees as function of the mean parking dwelling time for the case of a linear pricing of 5MAD/Hour and 10MAD/Hour respectively. We depict the driver utility in Fig. 9 and Fig.10 for a linear pricing of 5MAD/Hour and 10MAD/Hour respectively. One clearly could see multiple dwell time values where each scheme outperforms the others.
In order to illustrate the impact of the driver rationality, we plot in Fig. 11-15 the parking selection probability. Our analytical model developed in Section III turns to capture perfectly the desired pricing scheme and the drivers' behaviors as well. A global remark is that all of some of our pricing schemes outperform the legacy pricing scheme (linear pricing) whatever the parking dwell time. Overall, we notice that red zone is typically used by drivers needing less than 2 hours dwell time. Whereas blue zone attracts more drivers with a dwell time between 2 and 4 hours. The green zone absorbs almost all the generated demand while the dwell time becomes larger than 4 hours. Fig. 11-15 show an impressive result as they show how a driver behaves according to its rationality level. When drivers are not rational (σ = 0) or poorly rational (σ = 0.01), due to lack of information or simply due to an irrational behavior, the drivers are unable to properly maximize their utility function and the parking selection turn to be somehow random. Indeed, under irrational drivers merely tend to select a zone/parking randomly with equal probabilities (i.e., 1/4). Under extremely low rationality, the drivers select any of the available parking with the same probability for shortaverage dwell time, see Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 . When the dwell time exceeds 4 hours and becomes high enough, the drivers start to observe some on implemented pricing strategies. This explains why the selection probabilities deviate from 1/4.
Under moderate rationality regime (σ = 0.1), three overlapped regions emerge (see Fig. 13 and Fig. 14) . Now, almost 70% of drivers select to park in the red zone when their dwell time is less than 2 hours, which is quite satisfactory. The remaining 30% of potential parkers have selected an inappropriate parking spot, which is not that harmful. Under average dwell time (2-4 hours), almost 80% of drivers-parking matching is met. At high dwell values (more than 6 hours), almost all the drivers seek to park in green zone with logarithmic pricing.
When the drivers act in a fully rational fashion (Fig. 15 ), we notice that the three zones become unoverlapped and are fully separated. Legacy pricing seems out of the competition since it is almost never being selected. In other words, a zone is selected with probability 1 and the other zones are selected with probability 0. This means that from a driver perspective, the only zone/parking selection criteria of is the dwell time. Our goal of designing an incentive mechanism so as shortterm parkers and visitors may park nearby zones of interest, and mid/long-term parks should park a little far away is efficiently met.
4) JAIN'S FAIRNESS INDEX
Fairness is an important performance indicator for any bottleneck problem with some underlying resource allocation constraints. More specifically, a system stability depends on its fairness features in terms of available resources management, customer satisfaction, and how demand is being processed. There are many methods aiming to quantitatively measure fairness. Namely, we cite such as Max-Min Fairness, Worst-Case Fairness, Proportional Fairness, Minimum Variance, Jain's Index, Bossaer's Index, etc.
Without loss of generality and for illustrative purpose, we use Jain's Index to assess parking spot allocation. This approach is one of the most popular fairness measuring methods [35] . It can be used in various domains and provides a comprehensive metric to fully analyze the system behavior and its behavior fairness level. Indeed, Jain's index is continuous and valuated between 0 (totally unfair system) and 1 (totally fair system), and exhibits some nice scalability properties in terms of available resources and population size. Let λ i be the drivers arrival rate to parking i = 1, 2, · · · , S, then the Jain's index of the system writes:
We plot in figures 16 and 17 the Jain's index under difference rationality levels and different occupancy sensibilities. Globally these figures show how looks the parking allocation after implementing our dynamic pricing schemes. Figure 16 confirms the behavior seen earlier where non rational drivers is the only case where an efficient fair allocation could be met. However, rational drivers always select a parking that meets their expectation and dwell time. It follows that parking allocation becomes unfair in terms of generated demand. Next, we notice that the sensibility to occupancy has only a meaning for short-term and medium-term dwells, see Fig. 17 .
5) DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED
To better redesign the public space, the two proposed measures must be supported by an adequate upgrade of parking meters, and a gradual phasing-out of long-term spots. Moreover, off-street car parking in crowded areas and/or nearby zones of interest, is to strongly reject. Such a step simply generates extra traffic and reduces accessibility.
To sum up the driven case study, Casablanca's current parking offer in studied area could be enough if empowered with an optimal management as showed in previous subsections. Here, Measure 2 is recommended because it permits to meet both the objectives of satisfying short-term and mediumterm drivers and drastically reduce the number of commuters. However, additional measures are more than welcome:
• Places nearby zones of interest should be allocated to short-term and medium-term parks. Of course, the number of parking spots to allocate to these classes of drivers should not increase (about 10% currently);
• other areas equipped with parking meters should implement a logarithmic pricing (green zone);
• Implementation of parking meters with zone-based pricing alongside the hypercentre to control illegal parkings;
• The car park at Arab League park should be dedicated to short and medium-term parking without the possibility of a subscription for employees;
• Inappropriate parking selection leads to unfair parking allocation; The proposed measures enables to reinforce the regulation of around 3,300 spots, currently managed by parking meters, via an adaptive and incentive pricing combined with area zonification (red, blue and green zone). The various actions carried out promise the switching of about 600 longterm drivers to public transportation and the equivalent of 200 longterm spots to be freed up. Indeed, areas where we suggest to implement a red/blue zone comprises numerous zones of interest. According to the Casablanca dataset, this location exhibits and in average around 90% to 100% during the daytime. Undesirably, long-term parkers are the first to enter this area and occupy almost all available spots.
To the best of our knowledge, all smart cities' models consider smart mobility as an effective pillar. Parking is a key service for an inclusive and sustainable smart mobility. So the integration of this service within a smart city ecosystem is crucial. Our scheme is promising as it combines robust incentives with appealing realistic considerations. However, retrieving drivers' behavioral features, upgrading existing infrastructure, exploiting available data, support for empirically-driven insights, ensuring sustainability, etc. are still to be further analyzed. A rich debate and insightful discussions on these aspects can be found in [39] and [40] , where smart city service best practices, problems and solutions are extensively detailed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a dynamic zone-based parking pricing policy to solve the parking spots scarcity and traffic congestion in crowded cities. The administrative district of Casablanca is considered as a case study. Our scheme performs well in mixed-use areas, as it takes into account the presence of parkers of different profiles and thus different parking requirements. Our solution aims also to improve the rotation of attractive parking spots through strategic pricing inducing an efficient parking dwell time control. This way, one could grant an optimal parker-parking matching, meet fair sharing of public space among parkers, and fluidify urban traffic in the considered area.
As a future work, we seek to include driving costs in our model to assess the impact of parking relays, transportation multi-modality and pricing policy adopted on modal choice as an important mobility application to make city centers friendlier. We are also working with Casablanca metropolis on developing some new incentive mechanisms such as offering park-relays to users adopting public transportation.
